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Carrying Copyright Too Far: The
Inadequacy of the Current System of
Protection for Computer Programs
by
VIRGINIA R. LYONS*
Introduction
It is axiomatic that the law always lags behind technology.' No-
where is this more evident than in the legal protection of intellectual
property on the cutting edge of technology. Computer programs are one
of several forms of intellectual property that have developed beyond the
point where currently available forms of legal protection are adequate.
By the late 1970s, widely available computers made mass marketing of
computer programs a major new industry. Existing intellectual property
law, however, developed long before the advent of computers.2 The
overbroad protection currently offered for software limits development of
computer programs by prohibiting- anyone but the original developers
and their licensees from building on existing technology.
Congress addressed the problem of protecting developers' rights in
computer programs by trying to adapt existing copyright protection. 3
Current copyright law, however, fails to provide the best possible protec-
tion for computer programs.
* Virginia Lyons is a member of the class of 1990 at University of California, Hastings
College -of the Law. This Note is dedicated to Noel P. Lyons, without whose advice and
support it would never have reached its current form.
1. See Comment, Putting Too Much Teeth into Software Copyright Infringement Claims:
Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 12 J. CORP. L. 785 (1987).
2. The Copyright Act originated in 1790, while the first patent system dates back to
fifteenth-century Venice. B. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT
LAW 21 (1967).
3. On December 31, 1974, Congress established a National Commission on New Tech-
nological Uses of Copyrighted Works "to study and compile data ... concerning ... the
reproduction and use of copyrighted works of authorship.., in ... automatic systems capable
of storing, processing, retrieving, and transferring information .... FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 4 (1978)
[hereinafter CONTU REPORT]. The Copyright Act was amended in 1984 to clarify the pro-
tection afforded the holder of a copyright in a computer program.
In this Note, the terms "software" and "computer program" are used interchangeably.
The term "developer" refers to a person or corporation writing and producing computer
programs.
Protecting computer programs through the Copyright Act requires
"the stretching of traditional copyright concepts to cover situations for
which they are quite inappropriate." 4 Computer programs are not liter-
ary works. Treating them as literary works provides inadequate answers
to the problems facing the courts.5 The courts have attained some suc-
cess in adapting copyright law to software protection, but they have
failed to address the multi-faceted problem of setting a consistent level at
which protection for software will be limited. Congress must develop
new laws to deal with the issues raised by current litigation and to deter-
mine the proper scope of protectability to be afforded to computer
programs.
Section I of this Note examines the way copyright law has been ap-
plied to computer programs thus far. After outlining the Copyright Act,
the Note explains the technology at issue and examines the critical differ-
ences between computer programs and other copyrightable works. Next,
the Note analyzes major decisions and currently pending cases. These
cases provide practical examples of the need to determine the precise
scope of software protection, and illustrate the considerations which
must be weighed in developing a new body of law to protect computer
programs.
Section II discusses analytical deficiencies of some of the cases ex-
amined in section I, and identifies the danger of applying their rules to
more complex computer program copyright cases. The third section dis-
cusses the limited applicability of patent and trade secret protection to
computer programs. Finally, section IV of this Note suggests an appro-
priate level of protection to be granted to computer programs as part of a
new body of legislation not based on copyright.
I
Copyright Law
The primary goal of all intellectual property law is to protect the
interest of the public in having access to new information and technology
while providing artists and inventors with sufficient incentives for the
continued development of the types of property which are protected.6
One important reason for the creation of copyright law was the need to
protect authors of literary works against plagiarism, thereby rewarding
them for producing works, while making those works accessible to the
4. S. RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, at 898 (1987).
5. See Comment, Does Form Follow Function? The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copy-
right Protection of Computer Software, 35 UCLA L. REV. 723, 739 (1988).
6. M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] (1989).
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public.7 While this grant of proprietary rights effectively limits public
use of intellectual property, it encourages authors and artists to create.
This is the essential tension between interests underlying all intellectual
property protection.8
A. Statutory Protection
As the need for protection of ownership rights in computer pro-
grams developed, the legislature looked to existing law to find solutions.9
In the Copyright Act of 1976 (the "Act"), Congress specifically included
computer programs in the body of copyrightable materials.'° According
to the Act, a computer program is "a set of statements or instructions to
be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about cer-
tain results.""1 In 1980, Congress passed an amendment to the Act clas-
sifying computer programs as "literary works." 2 Under the amended
Act, computer programs must meet the same requirements as other "lit-
erary works" in order to be protected. Such works must be "original
works of authorship," 13 and protection may not "extend to any idea, pro-
cedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or dis-
covery .... ,1,4 The commonly referred to "idea-expression dichotomy"
arises from this section of the Act. This dichotomy is at the root of the
question of whether copyright is the appropriate form of protection for
computer programs.
B. Technical Distinctions
Many different types of material are protected under the Copyright
Act's definition of a computer program. 15 An understanding of the dis-
tinctions between the different types of "computer programs" currently
7. MACAULAY, SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 5 February 1841,
reprinted in MACAULAY, PROSE AND POETRY, 731, 733-37 (G. Young ed. 1967).
8. P. GOLDSTEIN, 1 COPYRIGHT § 1.1 (1989). See also, Goldstein, The Competitive
Mandate.: From Sears to Lear, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 873-75, 878-80, 895-96, 898-99, 903-904
(1971).
9. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 3.
10. Id. at 9.
11. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
12. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5667. Before the 1980 Amendment, there was some controversy among
authorities as to whether the definition of "literary works" protected by copyright included
computer programs. Section 101 defines "literary works" as "works, other than audiovisual
works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regard-
less of the nature of the material objects ... in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1982).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
14. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
15. See supra text accompanying footnote 12.
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protected by copyright law is essential to understanding the rules devel-
oped by the courts, and the weaknesses of the current system of
protection.
Computer programs consist of source code, written in an advanced
language, and object code, written in binary language. Source code can
be any one of many high-level languages in which the computer
programmer actually writes the program and inputs it into the com-
puter. 16 The computer then translates the source code into object code
which it can read. This process is called compiling. As a binary lan-
guage, the object code is made up entirely of "O"s and ""s, and is in-
comprehensible to humans in that form.'7
Firmware is the part of the computer that contains permanent pro-
gramming. Such programming is often incorporated into the structure of
the memory chips. The term "firmware" refers to both the memory chip
and the computer program that is permanently encoded on the chip.
Microchip encoding was established as copyrightable material by a 1984
amendment to the Act. 8 Microchips, however, are further removed
from the type of work that the Copyright Act was designed to protect
than any other form of computer program. They function as technical
tools designed to carry out a user's instructions and to control the moni-
tor, printer, and other pieces of hardware. Microchips carry out
processes and operate the computer. Their primary purpose is not the
passive expression of information. Congress amended the Copyright Act
again in 1984 to extend protection to semiconductor chip products,' 9 so
firmware is now copyrightable.
An operating system is a set of computer programs designed to con-
trol and organize the activities of a computer.20 This type of program is
often referred to as system software, and it allows the computer to read
other computer programs and to communicate with the user. The part
of the system that communicates with the user is referred to as the user-
interface system. Some parts of the system software are included in the
firmware of the computer, while others must be included in every com-
puter program.
An application is a computer program designed to perform a job or
to manipulate information. Applications are tools used to perform spe-
16. C. MIDDLEBROOKS, VAX FORTRAN 12 (1984). Fortran, Pascal, and Basic are some
examples of source code languages.
17. For a more thorough discussion of the technical aspects of source and object code, see
Comment, The Incompatability of Copyright and Computer Software: An Economic Evaluation
and a Proposalfor a Marketplace Solution, 66 N.C.L. REV. 977 (1988).
18. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1982).
19. Id.
20. R. THOMAS & J. YATES, A USER GUIDE TO THE UNIX SYSTEM at ix (1982).
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cific tasks. Examples of applications include word processors, data
processors, and graphics programs.
Documents are the stored sets of information produced through the
use of applications. They are the product of computer programs, but
generally are not programs in and of themselves. The relationship be-
tween a document and an application parallels that between a manu-
script and a typewriter. The document is the product generated when
the user's information is processed by the application. Like typewriters,
applications act as tools in this process. Just as the law distinguishes
between the protection offered to typewriters and that offered to manu-
scripts, it should differentiate between the protection extended to applica-
tions and protection of documents. Documents are properly
copyrightable because they are essentially the same type of work product
as books or graphics.
A database is a collection of information stored in a computer.
Most companies now use data processing applications that build
databases in which to store such information as personnel and finance
records. Specialty databases, which are available through subscription
and accessed by a modem, allow individual computers to pull informa-
tion from a remote mainframe through telephone lines. Of the large
number of databases currently available, the most familiar to the legal
practitioner are Lexis2 and Westlaw.22 Databases. can be categorized as
documents rather than applications and are therefore suitable material
for copyright protection.
Games represent the closest things to literary works to be found in
the realm of actual computer programs, as distinguished from docu-
ments. Expressions of creative ideas, games are generally designed to be
entertaining rather than useful. They exist not as passive collections of
information, however, but as applications, acting upon a user's instruc-
tions. Therefore, like other applications, games should not be included in
the body of copyrightable material.
C. Protectability of Source and Object Codes
In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,23 Apple sued
Franklin for infringement of the copyright of the Apple II operating sys-
tem.24 Franklin produced an Apple II compatible computer called the
ACE 100. Although there were some minor variations, the 'operating
21. Lexis is a registered service mark of Mead Data Central, Dayton, Ohio.
22. Westlaw is a registered service mark of West Publishing Company, St. Paul,
Minnesota.
23. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
24. Id. at 1243.
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system sold by Franklin in conjunction with the ACE 100 computer was
virtually identical to that covered by Apple's copyrights. 25 Franklin ad-
mitted copying the Apple programs, but argued that the operating sys-
tem contained no copyrightable material because an identical operating
system was "necessary ... to ensure 100% compatability with applica-
tion programs created to run on the Apple Computer."26 Relying on
Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artc International, Inc.,2 7 the Apple court
held that the source and object codes of operating systems were protect-
able under copyright law.28 In rejecting Franklin's argument "that
an operating system ...is either a 'process', 'system', or 'method of
operation,'" the court distinguished between the "method which in-
structs the computer to perform its operating functions," and the actual
instructions.29
D. The Idea-Expression Dichotomy
The Supreme Court first addressed the idea-expression dichotomy in
Baker v. Seldon. 30 The case raised the issue of whether the copyright of a
book which outlined a system of bookkeeping gave the author exclusive
rights to that system and, specifically, the type of account books illus-
trated in the book.3 It is a basic tenet of copyright law that only the
expression of a copyrightable work is protected. 2 The idea underlying
the expression is not protectable.33 If the idea can be expressed only in a
limited number of ways, the idea and expression are deemed to have
merged, rendering the work ineligible for copyright protection.34 Be-
cause the idea and the expression had merged in the blank account
books, the Court held that neither the system nor the illustrated account
books were the proper subject of copyright protection.35
25. Id. at 1245.
26. Id.
27. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982). Williams dealt with the copyrightability of the firmware
in a computer game. The court rejected Artic's argument that the program contained in the
firmware was utilitarian in nature and thus unprotectable. Id. at 874. It went on to say that
the fixation requirement in the Copyright Act does not preclude forms of fixation that are
unreadable to humans and, therefore, object code, as well as source code, is protectable by
copyright. Id. at 877.
28. Apple v. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1246-47.
29. Id. at 1250-51.
30. 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
31. Id.
32. M. NIMMER, supra note 6, at § 2.03[D].
33. Id.
34. P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at § 2.3.2.
35. Id. at 107.
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In SAS Institute, Inc. v. S & H Computer Systems, Inc.,36 the SAS
Institute (the "Institute") charged S & H Computer Systems, Inc. ("S &
H") with infringement of the Institute's copyright on SAS, a computer
program designed to do statistical analysis on an IBM computer.37 The
first claim dealt with unauthorized copies of SAS made by S & H in
violation of their licensing agreement. 38 The second claim alleged that S
& H had violated the Institute's copyright by basing its program, which
ran on the Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) YAX computer, on
the SAS IBM program.39
In order to produce a program which would run on the DEC VAX,
S & H had to translate the object code of the SAS program into the
correct numeric coding scheme for input into the DEC VAX.4°
Although the object code of the S & H program differed from that of the
SAS program, the court found many similarities between the source
codes of the two programs. In addition, the Institute presented evidence
of actual copying.4' The court held that the question of whether the sim-
ilarities constituted duplication of idea or expression was a question of
fact, and upheld the trial court's finding that "as a matter of fact that the
expression, and not merely the ideas of SAS" had been duplicated.42 The
court failed to determine the distinct point at which idea ends and ex-
pression begins.
The Supreme Court has yet to grant review to any case which specif-
ically distinguishes idea from expression in the protection of computer
programs. However, there are several court of appeals decisions on the
subject, one of which is Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,
Inc. 13 In this case, Jaslow hired Whelan to produce a computer program
to help operate a dental laboratory. Whelan sued for copyright infringe-
ment when the dental laboratory entered into an agreement with another
computer program developer to produce a similar, but not identical, pro-
gram which would operate on a different computer. 44
The rule in Whelan states that the purpose or function of a work is
the idea, and any element which is not necessary to that function is the
36. 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
37. Id. at 817-18.
38. Id. at 828. Finding of fact number nine indicated that the Institute did not sell copies
of SAS. It marketed the program through individual licensing agreements with each user. Id.
at 819.
39. Id. at 828.
40. Id. at 821.
41. Id. at 822-26.
42. Id. at 829.
43. 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
44. 797 F.2d at 1225-27.
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expression of the idea. 45 The court held that the idea of producing a
computer program to facilitate operation of a dental laboratory is not
protected,46 but if there are several possible structures for such a com-
puter program, that structure used in a copyrighted program is pro-
tected.47 The defendants unsuccessfully argued that the structure of the
program was the idea, and that the structure was therefore unprotectable
by copyright.4 ' The court held that "copyright protection of computer
programs may extend beyond the system's literal code to their structure,
sequence, and organization."' 49  Thus, when there are more than one
means of expressing an idea, the means chosen is not the idea.5"
E. Protectability of Screen Images
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 51 extends the Whe-
lan structure, sequence, and organization rule to audiovisual copyrights
of computer screens.52 Broderbund created a program called Print Shop,
which allowed the user to design custom greeting cards.53 The court re-
jected defendants' argument that there was a limited number of means of
expressing the idea of Print Shop, and that protecting the screens "would
be tantamount to affording protection" to the underlying idea of Print
Shop.54 According to the court, "[t]he menu screens in 'Print Shop' con-
tain much more than just instructions on how to operate the program.
Their artwork is aesthetically pleasing." 5 Because the screens contained
"'stylistic creativity above and beyond the bare expression,' of rules or
instructions," the court ruled that the structure, Sequence, and layout of
the screens were protectable by copyright.
56
Digital Communications Assoc., Inc. v. Softklone Distributing
Corp., 57 comes closer to actually drawing the line between idea and ex-
pression in computer programs than any other case. The Digital court
45. Id. at 1236.
46. Id. at 1238.
47. Id. at 1240.
48. Id. at 1235.
49. Id. at 1248.
50. Id. at 1236.
51. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).,
52. Id. at 1133.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1134. For a full discussion of whether screen displays are, or should be, in-
cluded in the copyrights of underlying programs, see Note, A Thousand Clones: The Scope of
Copyright Protection in the "Look and Feel" of Computer Programs: Digital Communications
Associates, Inc. v. Softklone Distributing Corp. 659 F Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987), 63 WASH. L.
REV. 195 (1988).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 659 F. Supp. 449'(N.D. Ga. 1987).
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held that the copyright of a computer program does not extend to the
screen displays created by that program.5" In Digital, the copyright-
ability of the status screen data communications system was in dispute.5 9
The court held that the screens were not covered by the computer pro-
gram's copyright." Finding that a single screen display could be created
by a multiplicity of computer programs, the Digital court concluded that
a screen display cannot be an infringing "copy" of a computer program,
even though a computer program can contain an infringing "copy" of a
screen display.6" Isolating the idea behind the screen displays, the court
said "the 'idea' is the process or manner by which the status screen ...
operates, and the 'expression' is the method by which the idea is commu-
nicated to the user."62 Although this is more specific than the Whelan
court's rule, it still leaves great latitude in defining "process, .... method,"
and "communication."
F. Issues Currently Facing the Courts
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. and Hewlett-Packard Co.63
involves audiovisual copyrights on the screens of the Macintosh Finder.'
The Macintosh Finder is a graphical user-interface system, which means
that it uses graphic images rather than characters to display many com-
mon functions. Such systems are more intuitive than character-based
systems, and are thus much easier to learn how to use.65 Apple claims
that Microsoft's Windows program and Hewlett-Packard's New Wave
program are copied from the Macintosh Finder and infringe Apple's
copyrights.
58. Id. at 456.
59. The status screens are part of the user interface, allowing the user to enter commands
or set parameters by typing the two character code shown on the status screen. Id. at 452.
60. The Digital court distinguished M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421 (4th
Cir. 1986), in which the court interpreted the audiovisual copyright for a screen display to
include the underlying computer program "to the extent the program embodies that audiovi-
sual display." Digital, 659 F. Supp. at 456.
61. Id. at 456. The court criticized the decision in Broderbund v. Unison World, 648 F.
Supp. 1127, for interpreting Whelan v. Jaslow as holding that screen displays produced by a
computer program are protected by the computer programs copyright. Digital, 659 F. Supp.
at 455.
62. Id. at 458.
63. No. C 88 20149 RPA (N.D. Cal. filed March 17, 1988).
64. Id., Complaint for Copyright Infringement and Unfair Competition at 4.
65. On the Macintosh system, the image of a disk automatically appears on the screen
when a disk is placed in the drive. Pointing the mouse-controlled cursor at the image and
double clicking the button on the mouse causes the contents of the disk to appear in a box on
the screen. Files and documents are represented by miniature pictures of files and documents.
Applications (computer programs designed to perform specific functions) have individual sym-
bols by which they are identified. The name of each document, file, and application appears
below its symbol.
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The first issue the court addressed pertained to a contract between
the parties which gave Microsoft a license to incorporate the screen dis-
plays of the Macintosh Finder into its own version of the program.66 On
motion for summary judgment, the court held that the contract was
valid, but covered only certain elements of the Windows program. Now
the court must examine those features not covered by the contract and
address the copyright issues raised in the case.67
Both sides raise strong arguments. Hewlett-Packard claims that
protection would hinder technological development by granting Apple
"exclusive rights to overall concepts and ideas which are indispensable to
the design of personal computers utilizing a graphical user interface op-
erating environment., 68 Apple has refused to license its developments to
its competitors,69 so if the Macintosh Finder is protected by copyright to
the extent that Apple claims, its competitors will be prevented from com-
peting with Apple in any meaningful way in a rapidly growing market.
Apple points out the tremendous time and expense which went into
development of the Finder. 70 If Hewlett-Packard is allowed to use a ver-
sion of the Macintosh Finder to compete with Apple, they will be reaping
where they have not sown. Apple's only reward for having developed the.
Finder would be a head start in getting their version on the market before
Hewlett-Packard's version,71 thereby limiting their incentives for devel-
oping new technologies. While patent law is supposed to provide incen-
tives for inventions, it has long been recognized as impractical in "high-
tech" industries due to the rapid development of technology that renders
an invention obsolete by the time patent protection can be obtained.
66. Exhibit C, Apple v. Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard, No. C 88 20149 RPA (N.D. Cal.
filed Mar. 17, 1988). In a confidential 1982 agreement, Apple granted the right to use and
license the system to Microsoft. In 1985, a new contract was signed by both parties, extending
and overriding the 1982 agreement, but the actual language of the agreements is too vague to
be immediately determinative of the dispute. Microsoft developed a user-interface system
based on the Macintosh Finder which it calls Windows. It incorporated the Windows system
in its own programs for the Macintosh and licensed it to other Macintosh software developers.
When Hewlett-Packard decided to offer a graphical user-interface system for its computers,
Apple refused to license out the Macintosh Finder. Hewlett-Packard then turned to Microsoft
and licensed Windows. New Wave, Hewlett-Packard's graphical user-interface system, is
based on Microsoft's Windows. In response to the release of New Wave, Apple brought suit
against both Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard for copyright infringement and contributory
copyright infringement.
67. Order, Apple v. Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard, No. C 88 20149 RPA (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 20, 1989) (order holding contract valid).
68. Answer and Counterclaim of Defendant Hewlett-Packard, at 16, Apple v. Microsoft
and Hewlett-Packard, No. C 88 20149 RPA (N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 17, 1988).
69. Id., Complaint for Copyright Infringement and Unfair Competition at 5.
70. Id. at 3.
71. See Comment, The Incompatability of Copyright and Computer Software: An Eco-
nomic Evaluation and a Proposal for a Marketplace Solution, 66 N.C.L. REV. 977, 993 (1988).
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The court could rule that Apple's copyright is invalid due to lack of
originality.7 2 Defendants claim that Apple copied the system from
Xerox SmallTalk and STAR and that the Macintosh Finder is a deriva-
tive of these programs.73 If the court finds Apple's copyrights valid, it
must decide whether New Wave and Windows differ enough from the
Macintosh Finder to avoid reproduction of protected material. This in-
volves defining the distinction between idea and expression. If the court
follows its own rule, as set forth in Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison
World,74 it will be extending protection to screens which have a distinc-
tively utilitarian features, as opposed to the primarily aesthetic features
included in Broderbund's Print Shop screens.
Lotus Development Corp. v. Mosaic Software, Inc. 75 and Lotus Devel-
opment Corp. v. Paperback76 are also currently pending cases dealing
with infringement of screen displays which are part of a user-interface
system.77 Plaintiff Lotus Development Corporation claims defendants
copied the structure, sequence and organization of Lotus 1-2-3, including
its "instructions, command and menu language" and elements of its
screen displays.78 The screen displays are not registered, however, be-
cause the Copyright Office refused registration on the grounds that the
screens were already protected by the copyright of the computer pro-
gram as a whole.79 Lotus' copyright may be held invalid on the grounds
of lack of originality, since Lotus is also currently named as defendant in
a suit for infringement8° which alleges Lotus 1-2-3 incorporated com-
mands, keystrokes, and screens copied from an earlier program called
Visicalc. 81
These cases illustrate one of the problems created by copyright pro-
tection of computer programs. Because programs are based on existing
technologies and techniques, most programs contain elements of earlier
works. Elements which perform their function well will be included in
later computer programs. If protection of computer programs extends
72. The standard for originality in a copyright claim is simply a requirement that the
work not be copied from another source. P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at § 2.2.1. A work may
be protected only to the extent that it meets the admittedly low standards of originality. Id.
73. Answer and Counterclaims of Defendant Hewlett-Packard at 14, Apple v. Microsoft
and Hewlett-Packard, No. C 88 20149 RPA (N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 17, 1988).
74. 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
75. No. 87-0074-K, (D. Mass. filed Jan. 12, 1987).
76. Id.
77. M. GOLDBERG, COMPUTER SOFTWARE 1988, PROTECTION & MARKETING 71
(1988).
78. Id. at 71-72.
79. Id. at 72.
80. SAPC, Inc. v. Lotus Development Corp., No. 87-858-K (D. Mass. filed April 8,
1987), reprinted in M. GOLDBERG, supra note 77, at 72.
81. Id.
1989]
too far, the result, in the absence of licensing agreements, will be a land-
slide of lawsuits in which each developer is sued by the owner of rights of
one or several earlier works.
II
Weaknesses in the Protection of Computer Programs
The rule expressed in Whelan v. Jaslow 12 provides a formula for
drawing the line between expression and idea,83 but the analysis on
which it rests is derived from the factors affecting literary works and is
therefore difficult to apply in the context of computer protection.8 4
The copyrights of other literary works can be infringed even when
there is no substantial similarity between the works' literal elements.
One can violate the copyright of a play or book by copying its plot or
plot devices. By analogy to other literary works, it would thus appear
that the copyrights of computer programs can be infringed even absent
copying of literal elements of the program.85
By extending protection of computer programs beyond the works'
literal elements, the Whelan court opened the door to extension of copy-
right protection beyond the expression of an idea to the idea itself, thus
violating section 102(b) of the Copyright Act. 6 This danger was created
by the broad definition of idea enunciated by that court. The Whelan
court could have found that the idea expressed in the contested computer
program was a specific method for organizing a dental laboratory. Such
a ruling would be much more consistent with the rule in Baker v. Sel-
don. 7 In Baker, the idea was not just to create a bookkeeping system,
but the specific bookkeeping system which the author developed.8 8
Under the analysis in Baker v. Seldon, 9 a book offering the same kind of
information that a typical data processing application provides would be
deemed unprotectable under the merger rule.90
The methods of organization "expressed" in applications are more
like systems, such as the bookkeeping system in Baker v. Seldon,9' than
82. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
83. 797 F.2d at 1236. "[T]he purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the
work's idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or function would be part of
the expression of the idea." Id.
84. Id. at 1234. The court rejected defendants' arguments that what is true of other liter-
ary works is not true of computer programs. Id. But the decision in Whelan has been widely
criticized. See Comment, supra note 1; Comment, supra note 5.
85. 797 F.2d at 1234 (citations omitted).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976).
87. 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
91. 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
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they are like literary works. Literary works are created in an entirely
different manner than computer programs. A great deal of research and
development goes into the creation of most commercial computer pro-
grams.92 Design decisions in the development of computer programs in-
volve technical considerations which are usually based upon utilitarian,
rather than aesthetic purposes.93
The fundamental reason why copyright protection is inappropriate
for software is that computer programs are utilitarian tools, rather than
pure expressions of information, like other copyrightable works. Com-
puter programs are the only form of copyrightable material that interacts
with the user. We read books, watch movies,' or listen to music, but we
don't "use" these types of works. Comparing computer programs to rec-
ipes illustrates the difference between software and other literary works:
Traditionally, utilitarian works, such as recipes, describe a process to a
person who then intervenes to lend the expressive words and phrases
their utility. For example, a baker follows a recipe and bakes a cake.
But computer programs not only describe processes, they also imple-
ment them. The program causes physical changes to occur in the
machine, and can interact with other programs, or with the environ-
ment. In short, a computer program really is the recipe, the cook, and
the cake itself.94
The strong policy arguments that support the improvement and de-
velopment of computer programs as utilitarian works do not apply to
most literary works. Although need exists for better, more powerful,
more easily used computer programs, no real demand exists for im-
proved versions of most novels. Even literary works that require updat-
ing, such as textbooks and atlases, do not receive the broad protection of
their sequence structure and organization which currently extends to
computer programs.95 Encouraging developments and refinements of
computer programs, however, is essential to maintaining and increasing
the level of progress in the computer industry. No such need exists in the
production of other literary works.
Now that the United States is a member of the Berne Convention,
any adjustments to U.S. copyright law must be in conformity with Con-
vention guidelines. The Convention does not extend copyright protec-
tion to computer programs; member status does not bar Congress from
92. Complaint for Copyright Infringement and Unfair Competition at 3, Apple v.
Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard No. C 88 20149 RPA (N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 17, 1988).
93. Computer programs are generally designed to perform functions, rather than to be
decorative. Therefore, aesthetic considerations are secondary to technical, functional require-
ments in the design of a computer program, even if the function of the program is to entertain.
94. Pilarski, User Interfaces and the Idea Expression Dichotomy, or, Are the Computer
Laws User Friendly?, 15 AIPLA Q.J. 325, 340 (1987).
95. Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986) cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
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developing a new system of protection for computer programs outside
the Copyright Act.96 Member countries are free to determine indepen-
dently what type of protection they will extend to computer programs.97
III
Other Statutory Means of Protection
A. Patentability
When the issue of the patentability of computer programs was first
raised, there were no Congressional guidelines for the Patent and Trade-
mark Office (PTO) or the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(C.C.P.A.) to follow because the Patent Act of 1952 pre-dates concern
for the protectability of computer programs.98 As a result of this lack of
information on legislative intent regarding the patentability of computer
programs, the PTO and the C.C.P.A. took opposing viewpoints on the
issue: the C.C.P.A. favored patentability, and the PTO firmly opposed
the extension of patent protection to computer programs. 99 In 1968, the
PTO took the position that "computer programming per se, whether de-
fined in the form of a process or apparatus, shall not be patentable.'
The first Supreme Court case on the subject was Gottschalk v. Ben-
son. Ol Benson involved a mathematical algorithm "for converting bi-
nary-coded decimal (BCD) numerals into pure binary numerals."1 12 The
patent application covered any use of the method, rather than limiting
potential protection to use within the context of a specific process. The
Court denied the claim on the basis of overbreadth. °3 The Court stated,
however, that its decision did not preclude patent protection for com-
puter programs. 1o4 At the end of the decision, the Court indicated that it
preferred to leave the issue of the patentability of computer programs to
the legislature.l° 5
96. S. RICKETSON, supra note 4, at 895-900.
97. Id. at 900. "Union members are not required to protect computer software as literary
and artistic works or, if they do, to accord national treatment to the software of persons claim-
ing protection under the Convention." Id. Many member countries would like to see the
Convention expanded to include computer programs. For arguments against such an expan-
sion, see id. at 898-900.
98. L.J. KUTTEN, COMPUTER SOFTWARE, PROTECTION/LIABILITY/LAw/FORMS
§ 3.03[l] (1988).
99. Id.
100. Id. at § 3.03[2].
101. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
102. Id. at 64.
103. Id. at 68-75.
104. Id. at 71.
105. Id. at 72-73.
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In Diamond v. Diehr, °6 the Supreme Court finally allowed a com-
puter program to be patented, but only as part of a claim for a process
which molds raw rubber into cured products. °7 The process included
the use of a well-known mathematical formula in the computer program.
The patent was allowed because the claimants did not seek to patent the
formula itself.' The involvement of a computer program in the overall
process did not preclude patentability.
Based upon this decision, a computer program can probably be pat-
ented only as part of a method or process working on a physical item or
producing a physical result. 109 Of course, in no circumstances will pat-
ent protection be extended to a mathematical formula or a scientific
principle.1 o
B. Trade Secret Status
Trade secret protection falls under the common law and state stat-
utes. Although rarely preempted by copyright law, and available to com-
puter programs, trade secret protection is impractical for most
software.' 1 ' The statutory requirement of secrecy, including inaccessibil-
ity by reverse engineering,' 12 makes trade secret protection inapplicable
to commercially available software, as sale of a computer program
amounts to publication of the object code, making that information
widely available and therefore ineligible for trade secret protection.
I 
'
The only situation in which trade secret protection applies to computer
programs occurs when the program is used exclusively by its owner in
the production of a separate product, examination of which would not
divulge the object or source code of the computer program.
106. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
107. Id. at 193.
108. Id. at 187.
109. L.J. KurrEN, supra note 98, at § 3.03[2].
110. Id.
111. P. GOLDBERG, supra note 77, at 91.
112. See id.
113. "Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who
can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain
its secrecy.
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 542 (1985) (as appr6ved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1979, and by the American Bar Associ-
ation, 1980).
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IV
Proposed Protection
The problems caused by the current level of protection extended to
computer programs were foreseen even before the most current line of
cases emerged. 1 4 Now these cases underscore the need.for a new solu-
tion. Many considerations must be weighed in developing a new body of
law to protect developers' rights in computer programs. The type of in-
formation to be protected is more technological than it is artistic, regard-
less of the level of creativity involved. As noted above, the need to
encourage improvements in computer programs is much greater than the
need to improve other forms of copyrightable material. 'At the same
time, granting too much protection stifles innovation. Accordingly, if
there are not equally good methods of expressing an idea, the merger rule
should apply and copyright protection should be denied. If the most effi-
cient method of doing a job can be determined objectively, exclusive
rights to that method should not be granted.
If copyright protection is unavailable, some other form of legal pro-
tection should be offered. The rights of software developers must be
weighed against the public's interest in maintaining some similarity in
the user-interface systems of computers. Uniformity decreases the
amount of training time required to learn to use new computers and new
programs. In' light of the benefits of utilizing a uniform operating sys-
tem, Apple designed the Macintosh so that most programs which run on
it use substantially the same user interface system. Such considerations
indicate that the scope of protection of computer programs should be
limited.
There are normally several different possible structures for com-
puter programs; developers choose the structure they use because they
think it is the most efficient for their needs. A computer company should
not be forced to use a sequence, structure, and organization which is
inferior because another company has a monopoly on the most efficient
system.
One possible solution for this problem is compulsory licensing of
elements of computer programs fol incorporation in other, programs.
Such a system would solve the problem of monopolies on the utilitarian
features of computer programs, without eliminating the rewards to devel-
114. See Note, Copyright Protection for Video Games, Computer Programs and Other Cy-
bernetic Works, 5 COMM/ENT L.J. 477, 502 (1983), analyzing the potential pitfalls in the use
of copyright law to protect computer programs. Unfortunately, the courts could not avoid
these pitfalls, and Congress has not yet legislated around them.
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opers for creating those features.1"' This system, however, would create
a huge burden on the regulating agency in charge of determining the
value of different types of computer programs and the terms of the
licenses.'1 6 In addition, a system of compulsory licensing would not
solve the problem of distinguishing idea from expression in protecting
computer programs.
Under any system for the protection of computer programs, literal
copying of source and object codes must be prohibited. Actual screen
images should be protected, but the sequence, structure, and layout of
the images on the screen, which are usually based on utilitarian consider-
ations, should be granted more limited protection.
The new system should also conform to the guidelines set out by
CONTU for protection of computer programs through copyright:
1. Copyright should proscribe the unauthorized copying of these
works.
2. Copyright should in no way inhibit the rightful use of these works.
3. Copyright should not block the development and dissemination of
these works.
4. Copyright should not grant to anyone more economic power than
is necessary to achieve the incentive to create.11 7
CONTU referred to copyright protection, but in order to protect
computer programs, copyright law should be abandoned and a new form
of protection created.
The new system should, like copyright, protect computer programs
from the time at which they are fixed in a tangible media. Like copyright
protection, it should be easy and quick to obtain, with a presumpiion of
validity. The system should also incorporate some of the elements of
patent protection,' such as a shorter term of protection.
Full protection for non-literal copying should cover both functional
and aesthetic features, but such protection should only last four years
from the date of fixation, or two years from publication, whichever is the
shorter term. This will be long enough to handsomely reward developers
for their achievements, while not granting an overly broad monopoly.
Protection against literal copying of source and object code should last
for ten years from the time of fixation. After ten years, computer pro-
grams are obsolete; derivative versions should be allowed a renewal term
of protection. Protection against nonfunctional features of screen dis-
plays should also last for ten years. Protection of functional features
115. See M. Freegard, The Berne Convention, Compulsory Licensing and Collecting Socie-
ties, 11 COLUM.-V.L.A. J.L. & ARTS 137 (1986).
116. See Comment, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An Idea Whose Time
Has Come, 8 N.W.J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 666 (1988).
117. CONTU REPORT, supra note 3, at 12.
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should, however, like protection against non-literal copying of computer
programs, be extended for only four years from fixation, or two years
from publication. This alternative term will allow for development of a
program without cutting in to a developer's potential profit by reducing
market lead time.
In order to avoid prematurely cutting off the term allowed for re-
search, "publication" must be defined as either sales of a computer pro-
gram, or release of large quantities. This will prevent the beta testing
stage of software development from triggering the publication term of
protection. 118
Independently created works which are substantially similar to
works which have been fixed but not published should not be held to
infringe the protection of the earlier created work. However, once the
work that was created earlier is published, its protection should prohibit
the unauthorized use of substantially similar works which were indepen-
dently created rather than copied. Such a system will provide incentive
for publishing new works as quickly as possible. Limitation of the open
market by a two year term of universal protection would be minimal.
Like copyright, there should be a presumption of validity in the new
system, putting the burden of proving lack of protection on the defendant
in any infringement actions. Due to the technical nature of many of the
issues raised in such cases, a specialized court should be created to deal
only with cases involving computer programs.l" 9 Any such system must
be federally regulated, in order to insure uniformity of protection.
V
Conclusion
The new system of protection for computer programs which is pro-
posed in this Note would solve many of the problems created by applying
a system designed to protect artistic creations to the protection of highly
functional technological works. It would provide protection in much
closer conformity with the goals of intellectual property protection than
that currently extended under the copyright law. Due to the increasing
complexity of the cases facing the courts in the area of computer pro-
gram protection, the time has come for Congress to create legislation
alleviating the dilemma caused by applying old laws to new technology.
118. Beta testing involves distributing a computer program to a limited number of users
who are unfamiliar with it in order to discover any flaws or weaknesses in its operation.
119. See Pilarski, supra note 94, at 345.
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